Failure analysis of a bearing in a helicopter turbine engine due to electrical discharge damage  by Budinski, Michael K.
Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 2 (2014) 127–137
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis
jo ur n al ho m ep ag e: ww w.els evier . c om / lo cat e/c s efaFailure analysis of a bearing in a helicopter turbine engine due
to electrical discharge damage
Michael K. Budinski *
National Transportation Safety Board, 490 L’Enfant Plaza East, SW, Washington, DC 20594, United StatesA R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 6 March 2014
Received in revised form 14 May 2014
Accepted 23 May 2014
Available online 10 August 2014
Keywords:
Bearing
Electrical arcing
Pitting
Compressor
Turbine
Helicopter
Electrical discharge damage (EDD)
Static discharge
A B S T R A C T
This article documents the metallurgical evaluation of a rolling element bearing that failed
due to electrical discharge damage. This rolling element bearing was used in a helicopter
turbine engine that failed in-ﬂight, resulting in a hard landing of the helicopter. Optical and
electron microscopy as well as energy dispersive spectroscopy were used to evaluate the
bearing. Pitting and material transfer on the external bearing races bearing and mating
surfaces revealed that the electrical discharge damage occurred while the engine’s
components were not rotating.
Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
On January 08, 2010 a Hughes 369D helicopter, experienced a loss of engine power and landed hard in the wilderness near
Kooskia, Idaho [1]. The pilot further reported that a chip detector light illuminated for several seconds about one hour prior to
the accident.
The Hughes 369D, serial number 470120D, was manufactured in 1977, and had accrued a total time in service of about
13,197 h at the time of the accident. The last airframe inspection occurred in December, 2009, about 30 h of ﬂight prior to the
accident. The helicopter was equipped with a Rolls-Royce/Allison 250-C20B turboshaft engine, serial number CAE-833319,
rated at 420 shaft horsepower (SHP). The engine had accumulated a total time in service of 7241.9 h and had undergone a
gearbox repair in October 2009, with the engine being reinstalled on the airframe in November, 2009.
The Rolls-Royce/Allison 250-C20B is a two-shaft turboshaft engine with a combination compressor, which consists of a
six-stage axial compressor attached to a one-stage centrifugal compressor. The engine incorporates a reverse-ﬂow annular
combustor, a two-stage high-pressure turbine (also referred to as the N1 gas producer turbine), and a two-stage low-
pressure turbine (also referred to as the N2 power turbine). The gas path along the engine ﬂows into the inlet, through the
compressor’s axial and centrifugal stages, into two external air transfer tubes and to the combustor, which is located at the* Tel.: +1 202 596 0437.
E-mail addresses: michael.budinski@ntsb.gov, mkbudinski@gmail.com
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.csefa.2014.05.003
2213-2902/Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
M.K. Budinski / Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 2 (2014) 127–137128very rear of the engine. The gases then turn 1808 toward the front of the engine and proceed through the two-stage gas
producer turbine (N1) and the two-stage power turbine (N2). Finally, the gases are directed out of the exhaust collector and
upward through two exhaust outlets.
N1, consisting of turbine wheels and nozzles #1 and #2, drives the compressor section of the engine through an inner
shaft, while N2, consisting of turbine wheels and nozzles #3 and #4, drives the power output gear (to the main rotor
transmission) and the accessory gearbox through an outer shaft. The inner shaft rotates independently within the outer
shaft.
The engine’s compressor assembly, part number (P/N) 6890550 had accumulated 301.9 h since overhaul and was
installed in the accident helicopter in June 2009, about 6 months prior to the accident.
2. Investigation
2.1. Airframe examination
The fuselage sustained signiﬁcant damage with most damage on the left side. The aft compartment ﬂoor was pushed
upward approximately 200 mm on the left side. There were multiple main rotor blade strikes to the tail boom, which was
separated at fuselage station 240. Examination of the ﬂight control system revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunction
or failure. The visual inspection of the fuselage and airframe components during the wreckage inspection did not detect any
burn marks, arcing, pitting, or signs of high temperatures stress associated with electrical arcing.
2.2. Engine examination
External examination of the engine revealed that it had sustained crush damage to the combustor case. A speed handle
was inserted into the N1 and N2 tachometer drive pads on the gearbox housing. Rotational continuity was established for the
N2 gear train and it was found to rotate freely without binding. During the attempted rotation of the N1 gear train, binding
was detected. The engine chip detectors were found to contain many metal particles imbedded.
Further disassembly revealed that the No. 2 bearing, P/N 6889093AL, ball retainer was fractured. The ball bearing retainer
was separated in two locations and numerous balls within were gouged on their surface and deformed. A thin oil ﬁlm was
present and no noticeable discoloration was observed. The shim and oil slinger were intact. A review of the records revealed
that during the overhaul, a new No. 2 bearing was installed: P/N 6889093AL, serial number (S/N) TA 36-0510763.
The compressor case halves were removed, revealing that the rotor assembly was intact with no evidence of damage
observed. The diffuser scroll exhibited circumferential rubbing, consistent with the impeller blades making contact. TheFig. 1. Picture of the as-received No. 2 bearing pieces, oil slinger, shims, retaining ring, and spanner nut as identiﬁed in the following list: (1) oil slinger, (2)
shims, (3) No. 2 bearing piece (outer race, retainer pieces, and two balls), (4) No. 2 bearing inner race halves, (5) eleven bearing balls, (6) bearing retainer
pieces, (7) retaining ring, (8) spanner nut.
Fig. 2. Photomacrographs of the No. 2 bearing outer race, pieces of the ball retainer, and a ball. View (a) shows the side of the outer race that contacts the
retaining ring. View (b) shows the side of the outer race that contacts the bearing housing shoulder in the rear diffuser plate.
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rotation. The No. 1 bearing was intact and had a thin oil ﬁlm; it was normal in coloration.
The accessory gearbox housing was removed and investigators again attempted to rotate the N1 gear train via the N1
tachometer drive pad noting that the binding was still present. The gears appeared to all be intact with an oil ﬁlm present.
Metallic chips (ferrous) were present throughout the gearbox. Binding was noted during rotation of the pump gear train, but
loosened with continuous rotation. Removal of the oil and scavenge pump revealed that the gears were intact with metallic
chips present. Light circumferential rubbing was noted on the separator plate (where the gear interfaced).Fig. 3. Images of the No. 2 bearing balls.
Fig. 5. Photomacrograph of the side of the No. 2 bearing outer race. The identiﬁed side faces the shoulder in the rear diffuser bearing housing. Examples of
craters and deposits on the surface of the bearing’s side are indicated.
Fig. 4. Photomacrograph of the two halves of the No. 2 bearing inner race.
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in a thin oil ﬁlm. Molten metal deposits were observed throughout the turbine section. The nozzle shield appeared normal.
The fractured No. 2 bearing was retained and examined at the National Transportation Safety Board Materials Laboratory.
2.3. No. 2 bearing examination
Fig. 1 is a photomacrograph of the failed No. 2 bearing pieces, oil slinger, shims, retaining ring, and spanner nut. Based on
the FAA-PMA (Federal Aviation Administration Parts Manufacture Approval) number 1L9D9, the No. 2 bearing is
manufactured by Timken Alcor Aerospace Technologies, Inc., Mesa, AZ. According to the manufacturer, the No. 2 bearing is a
30 mm inside diameter  55 mm outside diameter  13 mm wide ABEC [2] 5 with 13 balls. The bearing inner and outer racesFig. 6. Photomacrographs of a typical crater. View (a) is a higher magniﬁcation image of a crater on the side of the No. 2 bearing as identiﬁed in Fig. 5. View
(b) is a crater located on the shoulder of the rear diffuser bearing housing.
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to 61 HRC to 64 HRC. The bearing ball retainer is fabricated from aluminum alloy 2050 in accordance with AMS 6413, heat
treated, stress-relieved, aged to 28 HRC to 32 HRC, and silver electroplated. X-ray ﬂuorescence spectroscopy (XRF) indicates
that the bearing inner and outer races and the balls are fabricated from AISI type M50 steel.Fig. 7. Scanning electron micrographs of the side of the No. 2 bearing outer race in the location indicated in Fig. 6a. View (a) shows an overall view of a crater
with deposits. View (b) is a higher magniﬁcation image showing ﬁne craters and spheroids.
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fractured in several places. The fracture surfaces on the retainer pieces are too damaged to determine the micro mode of
fracture. The ﬂat-fracture macro-morphology on portions of the retainer fractures indicated in Fig. 2a is consistent with
progressive crack growth (e.g. fatigue fracture). Revealed by microscopy with a 5 to 50 stereo zoom microscope, the outer
raceway is damaged due to scoring, plastic deformation, and adhesive wear. No as-manufactured raceway surface remains.
Balls collected during the teardown are approximately 5/16 in. in diameter and are consistent with the diameter of the
balls from the No. 2 bearing. In all, thirteen balls are present. Using a 5 to 50 stereo zoom microscope, a number of the
balls had ﬂat spots consistent with adhesive wear due to sliding contact (see Fig. 3a and b). Some of the balls are reduced in
nominal diameter due to wear.
As revealed by microscopy with a 5 to 50 stereo zoom microscope, the raceway of the inner bearing race halves on the
No. 2 bearing exhibited adhesive wear and deformation damage as revealed in Fig. 4. No as-manufactured surface remains inFig. 8. X-ray map (upper image) and spectrum (lower image) of the region containing the crater/deposit feature identiﬁed in Fig. 9a
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consistent with excursions of the ball track path to the edges of the raceway. The external surfaces of the bearing races
appeared dark, consistent the oxidation due to heat exposure. The surfaces of the inner and outer bearing raceways and the
balls appeared silver-colored, consistent with rolling contact as the turbine engine decelerated and the bearing cooled after
the failure.
Optical and digital microscope examination of the side of the No. 2 bearing’s outer race revealed crater-like pitting and the
deposition of material as indicated in Figs. 5 and 6a. Similar crater features are observed on the mating rear diffuser plate
bearing housing shoulder as indicated in Fig. 6b. Because the side of the No. 2 bearing outer race and the shoulder on the
diffuser bearing house mate during use, the craters in Fig. 6a and b appear as mirror images. Scanning electron microscopy
(SEM) of features in the crater reveals areas of ﬁne craters and spheroids as indicated in Fig. 7a and b. Energy dispersive
spectroscopy (EDS) reveals the craters and spheroids contain deposits of chromium, consistent with material transfer from
the diffuser plate bearing shoulder to the edge of the No. 2 bearing outer race (the bearing housing in the diffuser plate is
coated with chromium as indicated by XRF). An EDS compositional map of the chromium distribution in the region of the
crater identiﬁed in Figs. 5, 6a, and 7 is shown in Fig. 8. Oxygen on the crater surface revealed by EDS is consistent with
oxidation due to the elevated temperature of the arcing process. The spheroids, ﬁne craters, and general as-cast appearance
of the crater features are consistent with damage produced by electrical arcing.
Fig. 9 shows a section of the outside diameter surface of the No. 2 bearing outer bearing race. As identiﬁed in the
ﬁgure, craters and areas of deposited material are observed on the outside diameter surfaces adjacent to the edgeFig. 9. Photomacrographs of the outside diameter surface of the No. 2 bearing outer race. View (a) is a higher magniﬁcation image of several craters. View (b)
in an overall image showing groups of craters along the bearing’s radiused edge.
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spectroscopy (EDS), reveals the craters contain deposits of chromium consistent with electrical arcing (Fig. 10).
Micrometer measurements of the outside diameter of the No. 2 bearing outer race indicate that the outer race is out-of-
round and has an average diameter of 2.1646 in. and a standard deviation of 0.0004 in. based on ﬁve measurements.
According to the manufacturer, the outside diameter of the bearing is 2.1654–2.1651 in. The inside diameter of the bearing
housing on the rear diffuser has an average of 2.1654 in and a standard deviation of 0.0003 in. based on ﬁve measurements
using a telescoping gage and a micrometer.
Examination using a 5 to 50 stereo zoom microscope and an SEM revealed metallic deposits of fused and re-solidiﬁed
metal on the surface of the oil slinger (on the oil labyrinth seal side) in a manner typical of splatter as indicated in Fig. 11.
When evaluated by EDS, both the base material and the splatter deposits contained primarily iron and chromium. The
morphology of the splatter deposits is consistent with fused metal ejected from the gap between the oil slinger and the oilFig. 10. Scanning electron micrographs of crater/deposit on the outside diameter surface of the No. 2 bearing outer race. View (a) is an overall image showing
a typical crater/deposit. View (b) is a higher magniﬁcation view showing ﬁne craters and displaced metal.
Fig. 11. Images of the oil slinger on the face contacting the impeller oil labyrinth seal. View (a) is an overall image showing the location of the metal splatter
deposits. View (b) is an SEM photomicrograph showing the metal splatter deposits.
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formation under static rather than rotational conditions.
3. Discussion
Based on the engine teardown analysis, the damage to the engine is consistent with the failure of the No. 2 bearing [3].
Metallurgical laboratory analysis identiﬁed electrical discharge damage on the outside diameter of the number 2 bearing as
well as corresponding electrical discharge damage to the bearing pocket on the diffuser plate. Additionally, electrical arc
damage on the oil sling is consistent with the arc damage occurring under static conditions rather than rotation conditions.
Based on literature [4–8], electrical discharge damage has been a recognized failure mode in rotating element bearings in
rotating turbomachinery and AC electric motors. Such damage is also known as electrical arc damage, and ‘‘EDM pitting.’’
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power in an Air Tractor AT-802A propelled by a Pratt and Whitney PT6A-67AG turbine engine. Failure analysis revealed that
the engine failed due to electrical discharge damage on the number 1 bearing. The electrical discharge damage was
consistent with an electrical arcing path associated with the starter generator. Such a failure mode was recognized by
Transport Canada and is identiﬁed in Service Difﬁculty Report [10] No. AV-2007-05 issued October 29, 2007.
The electrical arcing damage on the bearing oil slinger suggests that the engine was static at the time of the arc discharge.
The operator stated that since owning the helicopter there was no welding or high-energy maintenance performed on the
helicopter. It was further noted that the helicopter was not used for any electrical power line work and was never grounded
on the ramp except for routine fueling using electrical grounds provided by fueling facilities. Although a lightning strike
could produce static electrical arc damage, such an occurrence had not been documented for this aircraft nor had the
manufacturer’s Conditional Lightening Strike Inspection been conducted by the owner.
A plausible failure scenario is that the at-rest helicopter encountered a lightning strike or other high-energy source which
resulted in an arc discharge through spark gaps in the No. 2 rolling element ball bearing. Once the powertrain was powered,
pits due to the arc discharge damage resulted in scoring of the bearing balls and races, ultimately causing some of the balls to
slide relative to the race, resulting in adhesive wear. Such damage causes the bearing to heat, the ball retainer to fracture,
balls to fall from the bearing, resulting in misalignment of the engine shaft and ultimate failure of the powertrain.
4. Conclusions
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause of this accident to be: a complete loss of engine
power due to the failure of the No. 2 bearing, which was precipitated by electrical arcing that occurred at an unknown time
prior to the accident ﬂight.1. The bearings are a common source of electrical grounding between the case of a turbine engine and the rotating
components. Hence, bearings are a probable location of electrical arcing if conditions are sufﬁcient. Although the exact
source of electrical arc could not be determined for the helicopter, it is possible that a lightning strike or stray electrical
current could have precipitated such damage.2. The metal splatter deposits present on the oil slinger surfaces were approximately aligned in the same direction
suggesting that the arcing associated with the oil slinger occurred when the engine compressor was not rotating.
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